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This paper exploits a major mid-1990s expansion in the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs health care system to provide evidence on the labor market effects of expanding health
insurance availability.  Using data from the Current Population Survey, we compare the labor
market behavior of older veterans and non-veterans before and after the VA health benefits
expansion to test the impact of public health insurance on labor supply.  We find that older
workers are significantly more likely to decrease work both on the extensive and intensive
margins after receiving access to non-employer based insurance.  Older workers are also more
likely to leave self-employment, a result inconsistent with "job-lock" effects of employer-based
insurance, but consistent with a positive income effect from new access to public insurance. 
Some relatively disadvantaged subpopulations, however, may increase their labor supply after
gaining greater access to public insurance, consistent with complementary positive health effects
of health care access for these groups.  We conclude that this reform has affected employment
and retirement decisions, and suggest that future moves toward universal coverage or expansions
of Medicare are likely to have significant labor market effects.  To illustrate, we calculate that as
much as 10% of the difference in retirement rates in the US and Canada may be due to Canada's
provision of universal health care.
JEL Classification Codes:  J2, I18
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veteran
The research reported herein was pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security
Administration (SSA) funded as part of the Retirement Research Consortium (RRC).  The
findings and conclusions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views
of SSA, any agency of the Federal Government or the RRC.  This research was also supported by
National Institute on Aging Grant T32-AG00186.  We are grateful to Elizabeth Ananat, David
Autor, Dora Costa, Amy Finkelstein, Jon Gruber, Jim Poterba, Tom Saving, Ebonya Washington,
Julie Zissimopoulos and participants in the MIT Public Finance lunch and SSA-RRC annual
meetings for helpful comments and suggestions and to Alejandro Bras, Banashwar Ghosh, Erin
Harrison, and Rebecca Willis for excellent research assistance.  All remaining errors are our own.
I. Introduction 
Retirement policy formation requires a clear understanding of the factors 
influencing the labor force participation of older individuals.  Reforms encouraging work 
at later ages may prove ineffective if public health insurance incentives interfere.  
Economic theory predicts that public health insurance may affect job choice, income, and 
health.  However, the magnitude and direction of the net effects of public provision on 
labor supply are ex ante ambiguous.  Moreover, even where theory makes a clear 
prediction of the effect, empirical evidence has not always supported it.  In this paper, we 
use new evidence from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs to estimate the 
labor market effects of expanding public health insurance availability.  By examining a 
health insurance expansion that is tied neither to employment nor to other public 
programs, we isolate the impact of an insurance offer on labor supply for older workers. 
Previous research examining the relationship between public health care and work 
behavior has not provided clear answers to this question.  For example, government-
provided health insurance that is not linked to employment acts as a positive income 
transfer for those with low earnings or high health costs because it is paid for via taxes, 
and the employed subsidize the not-employed.  Theory therefore implies that universal 
insurance will likely decrease employment for these individuals.  Empirical evidence for 
Medicaid, however, which not only is not conditional on employment but also is means-
tested and therefore taxes earnings, is mixed (Winkler 1991, Moffitt and Wolfe 1992, 
Yelowitz 1995, Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001, Borjas 2003).  Depending on the 
population studied and the methodology used, studies find a range of outcomes, from 
large decreases in working to no change at all.  
Adding to the theoretical complexity, other effects of government-provided 
insurance might lead to increases in labor supply or labor productivity.  Health insurance 
may increase employment overall by improving health, which may also result in 
increased labor productivity.  In line with this prediction, Gruber and Hanratty (1995) 
find that employment increased in Canada after the introduction of national health 
insurance.  Additionally, studies examining the introduction of the U.S. continuation-of-
coverage mandates, such as COBRA (e.g. Gruber and Madrian 1995), find resulting 
increases in job switching.  By de-linking health insurance and employment (but not 
increasing income, since recipients must pay their own health premiums), these mandates 
may increase productivity not only by improving health but by enabling improved job 
matches, that is, reducing “job-lock”.1   
Most existing programs in the U.S. cannot provide the kind of policy experiment 
needed to distinguish the effects of expanding health insurance on the labor supply of 
older workers.  In general, social insurance programs that increase income conditional on 
non-work, such as unemployment insurance (Coile and Gruber 2000) and disability 
insurance (Bound and Burkhauser 1999), have been found to decrease employment.  
However, the theoretical predictions and the results of previous research are mixed for 
the employment effect of government-provided health insurance programs.  These 
programs are often structured so that they provide a mixture of income transfers, 
employment subsidies and/or taxes, and improvements in human capital (via health), 
leading to ambiguous net effects on labor supply.   
Medicare is a health-care income transfer that is not linked to employment, and so 
could shed light on the relationship between labor supply and health.  Some studies 
                                                 
1 For more information on job-lock, see Gruber and Madrian (2002). 
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(Lichtenberg 2002) suggest that Medicare improves health, though evidence is mixed 
depending on the time period studied (Finkelstein and McKnight 2005).  The empirical 
effects of Medicare on labor market outcomes, however, are difficult to disentangle from 
those of Social Security and other programs linked to the normal retirement age.  Most 
papers that study the Medicare-work relationship use dynamic programming or structural 
estimation to suggest that an expansion of Medicare will increase retirement (Rust and 
Phelan 1997, Blau and Gilleskie 2003, Johnson et al. 2003, French and Jones 2004). 
A unique opportunity to better understand the effects of universal coverage on 
older workers’ employment is provided by a major mid-1990s expansion in both the 
services offered and the population covered by the Department of Veterans Affairs health 
care system (VA).  This change allows us to study the labor supply impact of a program 
that provides an income transfer and may have health effects for some recipients, but that 
is not tied to employment or income, and is not bundled with other program changes.  
From a policy standpoint, the effects of this program change are likely comparable to the 
effects of expanding Medicare to Americans under age 65, a plan often proposed by 
politicians. 
We find that the VA expansion decreases employment, increases retirement, and 
increases part-time work among older recipients.  In addition, it results in a drop in self-
employment.  This outcome is inconsistent with a job-lock reduction (in which de-linking 
health care from employment would increase transitions from paid work to more flexible 
but uninsured self-employment), but is consistent with the effect of an income transfer (in 
which recipients no longer need either the insurance or the earnings from employment to 
protect against adverse health shocks).  Additionally, we find suggestive evidence that 
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veterans from disadvantaged groups actually increase their labor supply as a result of 
gaining public insurance, implying that for these groups, health improvements from this 
insurance expansion complement work.  Finally, we posit that health insurance may be 
one reason that retirement rates are higher in countries with national health insurance. 
The paper is organized as follows:  Section II provides a theoretical background 
for the effects of health insurance on employment, Section III describes the VA program 
in detail, Section IV describes the dataset and empirical strategies, Section V provides 
results, Section VI discusses and provides implications and Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Predicted Effects 
The impact of VA health insurance on labor supply is theoretically ambiguous.  
On the one hand, an offer of public health insurance acts as an income transfer.  With 
higher income but the same underlying wage rate, theory predicts that on average, labor 
hours will fall.  Some workers may move from full- to part-time work, because they no 
longer need the income to pay for insurance premiums or out-of-pocket medical costs, 
and thus substitute leisure for work.  Similarly, in response to the income transfer, 
workers may drop out of the labor force entirely, either temporarily or permanently (i.e. 
earlier retirement).  Finally, the income transfer would potentially lead to a movement out 
of self-employment, as individuals who were previously working in order to pay for 
health costs out-of-pocket will no longer need to do so. 
Along with acting as an income transfer, the offer of public health insurance 
should reduce job-lock.  Workers are no longer reliant on their employers for insurance 
coverage, and thus fluidity in the labor market should increase.  Workers have the 
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flexibility to change to job positions offering higher wages but lower benefits, and more 
productive employer-employee matches may result.  Older workers who are no longer 
job-locked because of insurance coverage will have the option of retiring earlier or 
transitioning to retirement by moving to part-time work without benefits.  Workers who 
prefer self-employment but were previously unable to afford insurance in the non-group 
market or payment of health costs out-of-pocket now have the flexibility to become self-
employed.  Thus, the reduction in job-lock may lead to an increase in self-employment 
that runs counter to the decrease caused by the income transfer. 
While both a job-lock reduction and an increase in underlying wealth due to an 
income transfer would predict a drop in overall labor hours on average, it is also 
theoretically possible that labor supply will increase for some groups.  An uninsured (or 
inadequately insured) worker with a chronic health condition that may previously have 
forced him out of the labor force may be able to continue working if the newly-acquired 
insurance improves his health.  The addition of health insurance may also allow workers 
on the margin of applying for SSDI (and receiving Medicare after two years) to stay in 
the labor force.2  Hence, labor supply might increase for some groups after the 
expansion.3
 
III. Description of VA Program 
Historically, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care system was a 
network of hospitals, established over 70 years ago for the purpose of providing specialty 
                                                 
2 Thanks to David Autor for recognizing this possibility. 
3 Note that an increase in health is equivalent to an increase in the relative wage since work is no longer as 
painful.  As such, for groups not at the margin, the attractiveness of leisure may increase and hours may go 
down.  
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care to veterans with conditions resulting from their military service.  Over time, the 
system was expanded to also include care for low-income veterans.  VA provided mainly 
inpatient care, with outpatient services for non-service-connected conditions available 
only as follow-up to an inpatient stay. 
 In 1996, the U.S. government began a major overhaul of this health care system.  
In an effort to catch up with progress in private-sector medicine, VA health care began a 
shift from an emphasis on hospital-based specialty services to a focus on primary care 
and preventive medicine.  The total number of patients treated in VA hospitals dropped 
44 percent between 1989 and 1999, while the total number of outpatient visits increased 
66 percent over the same time period (Klein & Stockford, 2001).  In addition to this 
change, VA’s resource allocation system was redesigned.  Following the HMO model, 
VA began distributing its health care budget using a capitated, patient-based formula.4
 As a result of these changes, VA anticipated that increased efficiency would result 
in significant reductions in costs per patient and in necessary staff.  With this in mind, 
VA felt that it would have the resources available to be accountable to the entire veteran 
population.  VA therefore changed its rules on eligibility for care.  Prior to the reform, 
VA guaranteed care only to veterans with service-connected conditions or low incomes; 
following the restructuring all veterans became eligible for VA health care (GAO/T-
HEHS-99-109).  As a result of the changes in the system, VA’s patient load increased 
from 2.6 million veterans in 1995 to 4.3 million in 2002 (GAO/T-HEHS-96-134, GAO-
03-1103R). 
                                                 
4 In a capitated payment system, the health care provider is reimbursed a flat dollar amount for each patient 
regardless of the services provided. 
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 Boyle (2005) examines the impact of the VA overhaul on veterans’ health care 
utilization and health outcomes.  That study finds that between 35 and 70 percent of new 
VA health care users are individuals who drop private health insurance plans, something 
that may have been linked to their leaving full-time employment.  In addition, she finds 
that while utilization of health care services increased, there were not net improvements 
in average veteran health, potentially because healthier veterans may crowd out sicker 
veterans who were previously the focus of VA care. 
 The VA restructuring affects the availability of health care for the entire veteran 
population.  For non-poor, non-disabled veterans, the policy change constitutes the 
introduction of a form of non-employer-provided health insurance that was previously 
unavailable.  Even for the previously-eligible (i.e., low-income or disabled) segment of 
the veteran population, this policy change results in a significant, exogenous change in 
health insurance status because the reorganized VA is a health care provider much more 
similar to what was available in the private sector.  Thus, even for previous users of VA 
care, the policy change resulted in the introduction of health care benefits that are much 
more substitutable for private care than anything provided under the old system.  We 
therefore utilize this exogenous introduction of an outside health insurance option for 
U.S. veterans to estimate the impact of publicly provided health insurance on individuals’ 
labor supply choices. 
 
IV. Data and Empirics 
We use data from the Census Bureau’s March Current Population Survey (CPS) 
for the years 1992 through 2002. We utilize a difference-in-differences estimation 
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strategy to compare the labor supply choices of veterans and non-veterans before and 
after the restructuring of VA health care.  Because of the small number of female 
veterans during this time, we restrict our sample to include only males.  Additionally, 
since we are interested in workers on the margin of not working (i.e. approaching 
retirement), we limit the sample to individuals ages 55 through 645.  With these 
restrictions, the treated population is therefore male veterans age 55 to 64, and the control 
group is male non-veterans in the same age group.  Since changes in VA health care were 
implemented throughout 1996 and 1997, we define 1992-1995 as the pre-policy period 
and 1998-2002 as the post-policy period6.   
 The CPS allows us to study labor market outcomes such as labor force or 
employment exit, retirement, and movement into part-time work or self-employment.  In 
addition to information about employment in the current year, the survey questions 
individuals about their labor market participation in the previous year.  In order to isolate 
the effect of the policy change on individuals’ decisions to alter their labor market 
behavior, we restrict our sample to those who report working at least one week in the 
previous year.7  We use a probit model8 to estimate the following equation: 
                                                 
5 Although it is not uncommon for individuals to continue work past age 64, eligibility for Medicare at age 
65 will alter the impact of other public health insurance on the work decision. 
6 In January 2003, VA again revised the rules for obtaining health care.  We therefore end our study period 
in 2002.  Due to concern that particular Vietnam Era veterans are affected by a 2002 change that allowed 
diabetes to be considered a war-related injury for veterans who may have been exposed to Agent Orange 
(Duggan, Rosenheck and Singleton 2006; Autor and Duggan 2007) we have also estimated all equations 
restricting our post-period to 1998-2001. Results of this exercise for the not-working outcome are shown in 
Table 5, Column (3).  Coefficent magnitudes are nearly identical when 2002 observations are removed 
from the dataset and significance does not change. 
7 This strategy is consistent with that used by Gruber and Madrian (1995).  We find that restricting our 
sample to individuals who report working at least 10 weeks in the previous year produces very similar 
results, as shown in Table 5, Column (5).  Regressions on the whole sample (i.e. including individuals that 
did not work in the previous year) also produce results that are qualitatively similar, although of smaller 
magnitude. 
8 We have also estimated the model using multinomial logit to account for the fact that individuals choose 
among multiple alternative employment scenarios in the post-period.  Marginal effects corresponding to 
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(1) yit = β0 + β1veterani + β2veterani*postt +β3Xit +δt + μit
 
The dependent variable, yit, includes indicator variables for labor supply outcomes 
including retired, not working, self-employed, and working part-time.  The variable not 
working is 0 if the individual is employed and 1 otherwise.  The retired variable is self-
reported retirement and is not available prior to 1994; retirement regressions are therefore 
limited to the years 1994-1995 in the pre-period.9  Several part-time variables were 
tested.  The part-time variable reported is coded as 1 if the number of hours worked is 
between 0 and 35 hours, and 0 if the individual works more than 35 hours.  Alternate 
specifications for part-time provide similar results.  Self-employed is an indicator that is 
equal to 1 if the class of worker is self-employed (either incorporated or not incorporated) 
and 0 otherwise. 
Among the independent variables, veterani is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual 
has been honorably discharged from active military duty, postt is a dummy equal to 1 in 
the post-policy period, Xit is a vector of individual characteristics including age, race, 
marital status, education, state dummies, industry and occupation dummies, and 
indicators for employer-provided health insurance and pensions and δt is a full set of year 
dummies.  Part-time regressions include an indicator of whether or not the employer 
offers a pension; all other regressions include an indicator of whether or not the 
                                                                                                                                                 
this estimation technique are very similar to the reported probit marginals, as shown in Table 5, Column 
(6). 
9 Self-reported retirement is not exclusive of working and often includes individuals who are still working 
full or part-time but no longer in a career job, still working at the career job but receiving retirement 
benefits, or involuntarily unemployed but over some age threshold, among other possibilities.  Unemployed 
older workers hoping to return to the labor force may or may not claim to be retired.  For more discussion 
of definitions of retirement see for example Gustman and Steinmeier (1995) or Araiza (2004).  Results for 
the not-working outcome limited to the same years as the retired outcome produce nearly identical results 
to those in the full sample, as shown in Table 5, Column (4). 
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individual is included in the pension plan.10  Standard errors are adjusted for non-
independence of the errors within the veteran*year group.11   
 Summary statistics are reported in Table 1.  These statistics demonstrate that the 
veteran and non-veteran samples are reasonably comparable in the pre-period.  The 
average veteran is more educated, and slightly more likely to have employer-provided 
health insurance than the average non-veteran.  Veterans are more likely to be retired or 
not working than non-veterans in the pre-period sample. 12
 
V. Results 
A.  Main Results 
Our primary results are detailed in Tables 2 and 3.  Reported coefficients for all 
regressions are probit marginal effects.  These regressions estimate equation (1) and are 
reported with and without controls for characteristics of the employer in the previous 
year.  Results are qualitatively similar with and without these controls, although the 
magnitude of the coefficient of interest (the coefficient on veteran*post) varies slightly 
across the two specifications.  In the remainder of the paper we discuss the regressions 
with the full set of controls. 
As theory would predict, providing free health insurance outside of employment 
decreases work for older workers and increases retirement.  As a result of gaining VA 
                                                 
10 There is no consistent variable indicating whether or not a firm offers health insurance, so regressions 
include an indicator for whether or not an individual is included in a health insurance plan. 
11 Results are robust to different clustering specifications including no clusters, age*year clusters, and 
vet*age*year clusters. 
12 One concern with our estimation strategy is the possibility of systematic differences between the 
treatment and control groups.  For this reason, we have also run all reported regressions including veteran 
interaction terms for every control variable.  When we allow all controls to enter for veterans and non-
veterans separately, the coefficients on the veteran interactions are typically insignificant, and our 
coefficient of interest is virtually unchanged.  This is demonstrated in Table 5, Column (1). 
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coverage, the probability of working drops by 2.47 percentage points for an individual 
with average characteristics.  Relative to the pre-period average, this is about a 10% 
increase in the probability that an older worker ceases work.  The introduction of the VA 
health care benefit increases the probability of entering retirement for older workers by 
.40 percentage points, a 2.5% increase relative to the pre-period veteran average.  While 
the magnitudes of these estimates are not particularly large, this is likely in part because 
while we measure the effect on the entire veteran population, only about a quarter of U.S. 
veterans actually enrolled in the VA system during our study period.13  The effects are 
therefore likely to be attenuated by the large number of veteran non-users, some of whom 
may have been unaware of their eligibility to use the VA system. 
As reported in Table 2, our results also suggest an increase in the use of bridge 
jobs, which are jobs (often part-time) that people transition to after retiring from a main 
job (Ruhm 1994).  We estimate a 1.24 percentage point increase in the probability of 
working part-time, which is an 11.7% increase relative to the pre-period veteran average.   
We also examine the effect of public insurance receipt on the probability of self-
employment.  A story consistent with “job-lock,” or labor market stickiness caused by 
workers’ reluctance to change jobs because they are afraid of losing health insurance, 
would predict an increase in (or at least no effect on) self-employment.  This is because 
prior to gaining public insurance, some individuals who preferred self-employment might 
have remained in a current full-time employment situation in order to retain health 
                                                 
13 Any veteran wishing to use VA care must first sign-up for benefits or “enroll” in the system.  During our 
study period, some veterans enrolled but did not actually subsequently use VA care.  The fact that these 
individuals enrolled indicates awareness of their eligibility and a potential desire to access the system at a 
later point in time.  It is not clear what proportions of unenrolled veterans are unaware of their eligibility, 
not interested in ever using VA care, or relying on the option of enrolling at a later date should they desire 
VA care. 
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benefits.  On the other hand, since the public insurance is an income transfer for 
beneficiaries, the program could decrease self-employment as people potentially no 
longer need the extra income to self-insure (or pay for) health risks.  In Table 2, columns 
(7) and (8), we find a negative effect of health insurance receipt on self-employment.  We 
estimate a 1.0 percentage point decrease in the probability of self-employment, which is a 
5% decrease relative to the pre-period veteran average.  This result suggests that the 
income transfer effect dominates any reduction in job-lock. 
However, it is important not to take these results as an indication that providing 
health insurance to these older workers is simply a productivity diminishing transfer to 
that group.  There are potential distributional differences in how people are affected; in 
particular, those in poor health might be more likely to see their health improve and their 
labor supply increase as a result of the health care expansion.  To test for this possibility, 
we separately examine the outcomes for subgroups who typically exhibit worse health 
than average.  For example, unmarried men in this age group are more likely to be in 
poor health than married men (Lillard and Panis 1996).  Additionally, being below the 
means test may be highly correlated with poor health (Kiuila and Mieszkowski 2007).  
We find some positive work outcomes for these disadvantaged (i.e. unmarried or low-
income) vets after they receive the health insurance offer.  The first panel of Table 3 
provides results for single men.  Single veterans are less likely to claim they are retired, 
less likely to be self-employed, and less likely to be working part-time as a result of the 
policy change.  The second panel of Table 3 provides results for those below the means 
test.  Although the result is not significant at conventional levels, low-income veterans 
are less likely to be not working after the health insurance offer and expansion.  A 
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caution must be offered with the means test results; veterans below the means test already 
had access to VA health insurance, but as described earlier, this insurance was not 
comprehensive.   
Nevertheless, combined, these results are consistent with a situation in which 
increased medical care for more economically disadvantaged groups leads to health 
improvements and a corresponding increase in the ability to work.  This result is 
consistent with some Medicaid literature that finds health increases and positive labor 
market effects from Medicaid among the poorest populations (Currie and Gruber 1996, 
2001, Moffitt and Wolfe 2002). Additionally, we may be underestimating these effects 
because although some conditions will improve immediately with treatment, some 
conditions may take time to show improvement.   
 
B.  Robustness Checks 
 In interpreting our results, we have assumed that the differential changes in 
veteran labor supply are directly attributable to the acquisition of public health insurance.  
This causal interpretation is legitimate as long as no prior veteran-specific trend exists.  
We therefore must ensure that veteran and non-veteran labor market outcomes do not 
move relative to one another as a result of unobservables that are unrelated to VA policy.  
Confirming this lack of movement establishes that changes in veteran labor supply 
actually result from gaining access to public health care. 
To test for pre-existing trends that differ between veterans and non-veterans, we 
estimate the same difference-in-differences regressions on pre-policy data.  We choose 
the years 1992-1995 because this is a period when no major changes took place in the 
 13
VHA.  We code the years 1992 and 1993 as the “pre” years, and 1994 and 1995 as “post” 
years.  In Table 4, we present a set of specification checks for the results reported in 
Tables 2 and 3.  These falsification tests reveal no pre-existing trend in veterans’ labor 
supply choices relative to their non-veteran counterparts.  The coefficient of interest 
(veteran*post) in these regressions is consistently small and statistically insignificant at 
standard levels.  In the single case where the coefficient of interest is significant at the 
10% level, the sign on this coefficient is the opposite of what we find in our main results 
and the magnitude is small.14
 Another concern is that there may be systematic differences between veterans and 
non-veterans that change over time.  When we allow all controls to enter for veterans and 
non-veterans separately, the coefficients on the veteran interactions are typically 
insignificant, and our coefficient of interest is virtually unchanged, as demonstrated in 
Table 5, Column (1).  Additionally, we use propensity score matching to draw veteran 
and non-veteran samples that are comparable based on observable characteristics.  
Results for the not working outcome are shown in Table 5, Column (2).  This strategy 
also produces results that are qualitatively the same and quantitatively very similar to 
those in our main regressions. 
 As discussed above, certain veterans were eligible for VA health care prior to the 
policy change.  Previously-eligibles (those with service-connected disabilities or low 
incomes) still have the potential to be affected by the change, since the types of health 
services available became much more comparable to those covered by employer-
provided health insurance.  Even so, we would expect to see stronger effects of the policy 
                                                 
14 The self-reported retirement variable does not exist prior to 1994 so we cannot run this falsification 
check for that outcome. 
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change on newly-eligible veterans, who go from having no outside insurance to full 
coverage under the public program.  Consistent with this expectation, in Table 3 we 
report results for individuals whose household income in the previous year was above the 
VA-established means test cutoff and find that they are generally stronger than results for 
the group below the means test.  Moreover, the coefficients for the not working and self-
employed outcomes actually switch signs from the main results.  These differences 
support the conclusion that the behavioral changes consistent with an income effect from 
newly available insurance are concentrated among those for whom it is, in fact, newly 
available.   
 Finally, VA health care covers only the veteran and not the veteran’s spouse or 
dependents.15  For this reason, the income shock is relatively smaller for married veterans 
whose spouses depend on health insurance provided through the veteran’s employer — 
they still lose insurance coverage for their wives if they reduce their labor supply.  As 
reported in the third panel of Table 3, the coefficients on veteran*post in predicting non-
work, retirement, and part-time work for those whose wives have insurance through their 
own employers (i.e. do not depend on their husbands’ employer-provided insurance)16 
are of larger magnitude than for those whose wives do not.  Thus, the magnitudes are as 
expected, although only the results for the part-time outcome are significantly different 
across the two groups.17  
 
                                                 
15 In cases where the veteran is catastrophically disabled or dies as a result of military service, the spouse 
and other dependents do become eligible for VA care under the CHAMPVA program.  This is not relevant 
in our study, however, as catastrophically disabled veterans will not be in the work force. 
16 57% of veterans in the sample have wives who are employed.   
17 The results may not be significantly different because the effect is clouded by the fact that wives with 
health insurance of their own often must continue working to keep that health insurance and the decision to 
retire is often jointly determined between husband and wife (Coile 2003). 
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VI. Implications and Discussion 
To facilitate a comparison of the labor market effects of this insurance transfer to 
other changes in social insurance, we calculate labor supply elasticities.  To do so, we 
must make several assumptions.  First, we estimate the value of VA insurance to be 
equivalent to the single-coverage health insurance premium for workers in 2002, or 
$3270.6018 multiplied by 102% (since COBRA allows employers to charge individuals 
102% of these costs in order to cover administrative fees), giving a value of $3336.  The 
average income of full-time workers in 2002 in our sample, dropping those with negative 
income, is $59,913.62.  By this calculation, VA provides an income transfer equivalent to 
(3336/59913.62)=.06 or 6% of the average individual’s income. 
 We find that individuals are 10% more likely to be not-working as a result of 
gaining VA coverage, implying a non-participation elasticity of 1.67.  This is more elastic 
than the result of .6 found for Social Security (Coile and Gruber 2000) and the range of 
.63 to .81 found for disability insurance (Chen and van der Klaauw 2007).  Individuals 
are 2.5% more likely to label themselves as “retired” as a result of gaining VA coverage, 
implying an elasticity of .42.  They are 11.7% more likely to report working part-time as 
a result of gaining VA coverage, which corresponds to an elasticity of 1.95.  Finally, they 
are 5% less likely to be self employed; this implies an elasticity of -.833. 
 Our methodology can also be used to make back-of-the-envelope comparisons 
about the likely effect of national health insurance on employment for this age group.  If, 
instead of using the hazard rate (that is, instead of limiting to people who worked in the 
previous year), we estimate equation (1) on the full set of men aged 55-64, the coefficient 
                                                 
18 According to National Compensation Survey:  Employee Benefits in Private Industry in the United 
States, 2002-2003, U.S. Dept. of Labor and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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on veteran*post for the not working outcome is equal to .0086.  Given that the not-
working rate for men in this age group in Canada is .4333 and in the United States is 
.3450, the gap between the two countries is .0883.19  Using this rough estimation, we find 
that .0088/.0883, or 9.96% of that gap, can be explained by the availability of non-
employer-linked health insurance for that age group. 
As final cautions, these results do not prove that offering health insurance will 
decrease employment overall.  Indeed, our results are not inconsistent with Gruber and 
Hanratty (1995), which finds that total employment rises with the introduction of national 
health insurance.  Note that we are only examining the effects on men close to the end of 
their full-time work-lives; social norms may keep prime-aged males in the labor force 
regardless of the offer of outside health insurance.  Given that US labor market laws 
protecting older workers reduce job separations for older men (Lahey 2007), insurance 
may, by encouraging older workers on the margin to retire and be replaced by less-
experienced (and thus less costly under an assumption of Lazear contracts) workers, 
result in more productive job matches.  Additionally, as discussed above, health 
insurance may improve the productivity of the unhealthy on the margin of working by 
increasing their health capital.20  Finally, overall social welfare may increase even with 
declining labor supply among some groups, e.g. if this insurance allows unhealthy 
workers with liquidity constraints to cut down on full-time work.   
 
 
                                                 
19 Thanks to Kevin Milligan for the relevant statistics for Canada.  These statistics were calculated from the 
Statistics Canada Labour Force Survey for the years 1998 to 2002 for men ages 55-64. 
20  Additional general equilibrium effects may also increase the average age of workers at small firms and 
decrease it at large firms since small firms are less likely to offer health insurance.  If these effects are large 
enough, the compensating wage differential at small firms may decrease. 
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VII. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we find that providing free comprehensive health insurance outside 
of employment decreases full-time work for older workers and increases both part-time 
work and non-work.  Our finding of a decrease in self-employment implies that the 
income effect of public insurance receipt dominates the reduction in job-lock.  To the 
extent that younger workers subsidize national health insurance for older workers, the 
income effect on older people from universal coverage may be a reason that non-
employment is higher for older people in countries with national health coverage.  
However, lower employment in these groups may be efficient to the extent that it allows 
for more productive sorting into work and retirement.
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics, CPS 1992-2002*
Pre Post Pre Post 
(N=7684) (N=8150) (N=6195) (N=10692)
Age 59.364 58.849 58.474 58.652 
Married 0.812 0.804 0.803 0.791 
White 0.934 0.913 0.852 0.851 
No HS 0.144 0.063 0.294 0.209 
HS 0.352 0.352 0.309 0.299 
Some College 0.238 0.295 0.151 0.178 
College Grad 0.16 0.172 0.112 0.152 
Grad School 0.107 0.118 0.134 0.163 
Pension Plan 0.429 0.486 0.404 0.44 
Empl. HI Plan 0.627 0.652 0.581 0.595 
Northeast 0.238 0.221 0.262 0.229 
Midwest 0.26 0.249 0.248 0.234 
South 0.289 0.281 0.294 0.306 
West 0.213 0.281 0.196 0.231 
Not Working 0.25 0.225 0.229 0.198 
Retired** 0.163 0.148 0.12 0.106 
Self-Employed 0.201 0.166 0.209 0.192 
Part Time 0.106 0.104 0.093 0.09 
Occupations: 
Prof/Management 0.259 0.28 0.256 0.298 
Tech/Sales/Cleric 0.186 0.187 0.148 0.148 
Service 0.07 0.074 0.087 0.081 
Farming 0.046 0.032 0.064 0.051 
Craftsman 0.145 0.149 0.138 0.136 
Operator 0.144 0.14 0.168 0.161 
Industries: 
Agric/Mining 0.045 0.034 0.06 0.052 
Construction 0.068 0.07 0.078 0.082 
Manufacturing 0.16 0.147 0.182 0.151 
Transport/Commun 0.078 0.098 0.064 0.067 
Trade 0.137 0.125 0.149 0.131 
Finance/Real estate 0.051 0.053 0.045 0.05 
Business/Repair 0.045 0.051 0.044 0.055 
Personal 0.032 0.028 0.03 0.037 
Public 0.051 0.065 0.032 0.033 
Professional 0.14 0.133 0.142 0.173 
*Sample includes males ages 55-64 and employed last year
**Number of observations for Retired is 3628 for pre veterans and 3196 for pre non-veterans 
because the variable does not exist in 1992-1993
Veterans  Non-Veterans 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Not Working Not Working Retired Retired Part Time Part Time Self Employed Self Employed
veteran*post 0.0179** 0.0247** 0.0142** 0.0040** 0.0099* 0.0124** -0.0144** -0.0102**
(0.0064) (0.0043) (0.0032) (0.0012) (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0035)
veteran 0.0140** 0.0078** 0.0161** 0.0094** -0.0004 0.0029 -0.0275** -0.0065+
(0.0048) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0039)
married 0.1098** 0.0251** 0.0764** 0.0145** -0.0254** -0.0163** 0.0151** 0.0199**
(0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0039) (0.0026) (0.0051) (0.0042) (0.0048) (0.0049)
nonwhite 0.0494** 0.0225** 0.0174* -0.0015 -0.0103 -0.0157* -0.0731** -0.0508**
(0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0074) (0.0036) (0.0073) (0.0064) (0.0092) (0.0072)
pension -0.1327** -0.0388** -0.0409** -0.1230**
(0.0055) (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0048)
health ins -0.0376** 0.0166** -0.0486** -0.1234**
(0.0082) (0.0015) (0.0044) (0.0053)
Observations 32721 32721 25666 25666 23978 23978 32721 31250
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Note: Coefficient estimates are taken from a probit regression of veteran and veteran x post as described in eq. (1).   Marginal effects are reported.  
Regressions include age, state, year and education dummies and  a constant.  Health insurance denotes whether or not an individual is included in a 
health insurance plan in the previous year.  Part-time regressions include a control for whether the firm offers a pension plan, all other regressions 
include a control for whether or not the individual has a pension.  Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on veteran and year.  Regression 
universe is restricted to men who were employed at least one week in the year prior to the survey year.  
Table 2
 Effect of Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply Outcomes
 
Not Working Retired Self Employed Part Time Not Working Retired Self Employed Part Time
veteran*post 0.0329** 0.0080** -0.0033 0.0225** 0.0039 -0.0060* -0.0276** -0.0218*
(0.0042) (0.0015) (0.0051) (0.0046) (0.0072) (0.0030) (0.0067) (0.0085)
veteran 0.0011 0.0051** -0.0114* -0.0019 0.0219** 0.0192** 0.0173** 0.0198**
(0.0027) (0.0010) (0.0049) (0.0034) (0.0059) (0.0043) (0.0062) (0.0089)
Sig. Different? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26221 20528 25049 18704 6500 5138 6201 5274
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Not Working Retired Self Employed Part Time Not Working Retired Self Employed Part Time
veteran*post 0.0280** 0.0043** -0.0113** 0.0113** -0.0183 0.0060 0.0011 0.00083
(0.0043) (0.0012) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0205) (0.0038) (0.0100) (0.0218)
veteran 0.0047+ 0.0072** -0.0065* -0.0019* 0.0559** 0.0176** -0.0070 0.0331**
(0.0028) (0.0008) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0170) (0.0038) (0.0092) (0.0138)
Sig. Different? Yes No No No
Observations 27677 21781 26281 21066 5044 3885 4969 2912
Not Working Retired Self Employed Part Time Not Working Retired Self Employed Part Time
veteran*post 0.0514** 0.0064 -0.0029** 0.0365** 0.0190* -0.0012 -0.0030* 0.0137*
(0.0073) (0.0054) (0.0009) (0.0078) (0.0087) (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0056)
veteran -0.0143** 0.0114* 0.0010+ -0.0176** 0.0109* 0.0160** 0.0009 0.0105*
(0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0006) (0.0054) (0.0050) (0.0028) (0.0008) (0.0034)
Sig. Different? No No No Yes
Observations 12603 12603 10983 8673 13197 13197 10955 9672
Table 3  
Results by Group Status
Below Means Test
III.  By Wife’s Health Insurance Status
II.  By Estimated Means Test Cutoff
Wife Has Employer-Provided Health Insurance Wife Without Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
Above Means Test
I.  By Marital Status
Married Single
Note: Coefficient estimates are taken from a probit regression of veteran and veteran x post as described in eq. (1).  Marginal effects are 
reported.   Regressions are restricted to those who worked at least one week in the year prior to the survey.  Regressions include age, race, 
marital status, whether the individual is included in a health insurance plan in the previous year and a full set of state, year, industry, 
occupation, and education dummies and a constant.  Part-time regressions include a control for whether the firm offers a pension plan, all 
other regressions include a control for whether or not the individual has a pension.  Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on 
veteran and year. “Sig. Different” reports whether the veteran*post coefficients for the two populations are statistically significantly different 
from one another at the 5% level. The regression universe in "By Estimated Means Test Cutoff - Above" is restricted to those persons who 
are above the income means test (given number of children under the age of 18) needed to meet the VA requirement prior to the reform.  
The regression universe in "By Estimated Means Test Cutoff - Below" is restricted to those below the same income means test.  The 
regression universe in "Marital Status - Married" is restricted to married men.  The universe in "Marital Status - Single" is restricted to not 
married men.  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Not Working Not Working Self Employed Self Employed Part Time Part Time
veteran*post -0.0161+ -0.0017 0.0001 -0.0068 -0.0079 -0.0066
(0.0095) (0.0084) (0.0079) (0.0069) (0.0061) (0.0062)
veteran 0.0212* 0.0098+ -0.0272** -0.0006 0.0042 0.0070*
(0.0091) (0.0054) (0.0049) (0.0045) (0.0032) (0.0033)
married 0.1186** 0.0344** 0.0085 0.0217* -0.0337** -0.0218**
(0.0044) (0.0079) (0.0067) (0.0092) (0.0081) (0.0061)
nonwhite 0.0522** 0.0249+ -0.0946** -0.0640** -0.0098 -0.0153
(0.0096) (0.0151) (0.0103) (0.0069) (0.00107) (0.0097)
pension -0.1500** -0.1226** -0.0344**
(0.0078) (0.0047) (0.0059)
health insurance -0.0432** -0.1306** -0.0542**
(0.0118) (0.0108) (0.0068)
Observations 13879 13879 13879 13292 9863 9863
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4 
 Specification Checks:  "Pre" = 1992-1993, "Post" = 1994-1995
Note: Coefficient estimates are taken from a probit regression of veteran and veteran x post as described in eq. (1).  Marginal 
effects are reported.  Regressions include age, state, year and education dummies and a constant. Health insurance denotes 
whether or not an individual is included in a health insurance plan in the previous year.  Part-time regressions include a control for 
whether the firm offers a pension plan, all other regressions include a control for whether or not the individual has a pension.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on veteran and year. Regression universe is restricted to men who are 
currently employed in the survey year.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fully interacted propensity 
score matching




veteran*post 0.0232** 0.0225* 0.0259** 0.0225** 0.0231** 0.0326**
(0.0045) (0.0095) (0.0053) (0.0070) (0.0042) (0.0050)
veteran -0.0081 0.0081 0.0071* 0.0096+ 0.0052+ 0.0068*
(0.0244) (0.0050) (0.0029) (0.0053) (0.0029) (0.0031)
married 0.0304** 0.0331** 0.0236** 0.0234** 0.0365** 0.0403**
(0.0073) (0.0109) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0047) (0.0053)
nonwhite 0.0217** 0.0093 0.0203* 0.0168* 0.0215** 0.0095
(0.0058) (0.0124) (0.0081) (0.0069) (0.0065) (0.0082)
Observations 32721 32574 27446 25666 31680 31675
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 5
Further Specification Checks, Dependent Variable = Not Working
Notes:  Coefficient estimates are taken from a probit regression as described in eq. (1), except column (6) which provides the results for a 
multinomial logit regression.  Marginal effects are reported.   Regressions are restricted to those who worked at least one week in the year 
prior to the survey, except column (5) which is restricted to those who worked at least 10 weeks in the year prior to the survey.  Regressions 
include age, race, marital status, whether the individual is included in a health insurance plan in the previous year and a full set of state, year, 
industry, occupation, and education dummies and a constant.  Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on veteran and year.  
Column (1) reports results with all controls interacted with veteran.  Column (2) reports the results for a propensity score-matched sample.  
Columns (3) and (4) change the universe to not include years after 2002 or before 1994 respectively.  Column (6) reports results from a 
multinomial logit regression that includes outcomes for full-time for an employer, part-time for an employer, self-employment (full or part 
time) and not employed.  Reported results are marginal effects for the not employed outcome.
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